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CRIMINAL LAW: 'THE GAP BETWEEN ATTEMPT LAW
AND PERJURY IN FLORIDA
Adamsv. Wainwright, 394 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 1981)
Petitioner was charged' with testifying falsely 2 in a grand jury investigation. 3 At trial, pursuant to the request of defense counsel, 4 the jury was instructed on perjury and attempted perjury. 5 The jury found petitioner guilty
of the latter offense. On appeal, the conviction was affirmed 6 despite petitioner's
claim that a conviction for a nonexistent crime denied him due process.
1. 394 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 1981). Petitioner was charged with a violation of the state perjury
statute. FLA. STAT. §837.02 (1979) provides: "Whoever makes a false statement which he does
not believe to be true, under oath in an official proceeding in regard to any material matter
shall be guilty of a felony of the third degree .... "
2. Transcript of Testimony, Record in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Adams
v. State, 320 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1975). Petitioner was Chief of Police of the City of
Kissimmee. A grand jury was investigating a claim by petitioner that two bullets had been
fired into his police car while he was investigating a potential burglary. Samples of paint had
been discovered near the scene of the alleged shooting, and petitioner had taken them to the
Sanford Crime Laboratory for analysis. The lab report showed that the paint samples did not
match the paint of petitioner's car. The false statement made by petitioner was that these
paint samples had not been returned to him by the laboratory. Id.
3. The investigation by a grand jury of a crime within its province to investigate and
indict is a judicial proceeding and perjury before such jury is within the statute penalizing
perjury in judicial proceedings. Rivers v. State, 121 Fla. 887, 889, 164 So. 544, 545 (1936);
Tindall v. State, 99 Fla. 1132, 11536, 128 So. 494, 496 (1930). Accord, Cherry v. State, 6 Fla.
679, 685 (1856) (grand jury as 'coordinate branch of the judiciary').
4. Adams v. Murphy, 598 F.2d 982, 983 (5th Cir. 1979). The pertinent discussion took
place as follows:
BY THE COURT: Have both of you looked at and approved the verdicts?
BY MR. DAUKSCH (Adams' counsel): No, I haven't looked at them. That is the one
thing I apologize to the court for ....
How about attempted perjury?
BY THE COURT: Well, do you think that is a lesser included offense?
BY MR. DAUKSCH: Well, I don't know. I think that the courts have held that everything
has an attempt to it.
BY THE COURT: You want an attempt? I am not certain there is such a crime, but if
you want it I'll put it in there.
BY MR. DAUKSCH: I do specifically request it.
BY THE COURT: All right. Fine.
Id. n.2.
5. The defense was hoping for what is known as a jury pardon. In Brown v. State, 206
So. 2d 377 (Fla. 1968), it was held that a jury must be instructed on all lesser degrees of the
offense charged. See State v. Terry, 336 So. 2d 65, 68 (Fla. 1976) (reaffirming Brown, thereby
causing the issue of which attempts are criminally punishable to gain increased attention in
the Florida courts); Cf. Keenan v. State, 379 So. 2d 147, 148 n.5. (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1980)
(jury pardon known nationally as jury nullification). See generally Comment, Criminal Law:
Instructions to the Jury on Lesser Degrees and Lesser Included Offenses, 21 U. FLA. L. Rav.
123 (1969).
6. Adams v. State, 320 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1975).
7. Brief of Respondent at 14, Adams v. Murphy, 598 F.2d 982 (5th Cir. 1979). Respondent
maintained that because defense counsel had not only failed to object to the instruction on
attempted perjury, but had also invited the instruction, petitioner's claim should be barred.
Under Florida law, failure to object to an instruction prior to the jury's deliberation precludes any appeal on that issue. White v, State, 324 So. 2d 115, 115-16 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1975).
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Petitioner unsuccessfully sought first a writ of certiorari,s and then a writ of
habeas corpus in the Florida supreme court. Subsequently,. he was granted relief by a federal district court9 which overturned the conviction."° Respondent
appealed to the Fifth Circuit, which certified to the Florida supreme court the
question "Is attempted perjury in an official proceeding a criminal offense
under the laws of Florida?"" Responding to the certified question, the Florida
supreme court HELD, that attempted perjury is not a criminal offense under
2

Florida law.'

Prior to the nineteenth century, the prevailing view was that an attempt
could not constitute a criminal offense. Legal sanctions existed only to insure
reparation for harm done.' 3 Since an attempt produced no damage, no sanction
was necessary.1 4 Gradually, however, it was recognized that an attempt could
insure the interests of the state in preserving public order.'1 As the law began
to focus on acts that harmed society, attempts to commit some of the more
common crimes, such as procuring perjured testimony in the King's courts and
bribing the King's officers, became criminalized.16
Failure to comply with this procedural rule precludes the federal courts from considering the
issue. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 86-87 (1977).
An exception to this rule allows appellate courts to consider fundamental error appearing
on the face of the record although such error is not assigned as a ground for new trial.
McPhee v. State, 254 So. 2d 406, 410-11 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1971). But an exception to this exception is the invited error rule, which arises when the error is a result of active urging by
appellant. Id. Federal standards governing this situation are consistent with Florida law. See
Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977); Rawlins v. Craven, 329 F. Supp. 40, 41 (C.D.

Cal. 1971).
8. Adams v. State, 339 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 1976). The writ was originally granted, but was
later discharged when the court determined that it lacked jurisdiction.
9. Respondent also maintained that the federal district court did not have jurisdiction
because an appeal to the Fourth District Court of Appeal was pending when the petition for
federal habeas corpus relief was filed. Brief of Respondent at 10, Adams v. Murphy, 598 F.2d
982 (5th Cir. 1979). The principle of comity requires that the state appellate forum be given
an opportunity to rule on appellant's claim before federal action is instituted. See Picard v.
Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 419-20 (1963).
Even assuming proper jurisdiction, Respondent maintained that the court's rulings on
petitioner's direct appeals and habeas corpus proceeding made the question one of state law.
Brief of Respondent at 11, Adams v. Murphy, 598 F.2d 982 (5th Cir. 1979). It is well settled
that federal courts reviewing state court convictions in a habeas corpus proceeding have no
jurisdiction to consider and decide matters of state law. See, e.g., Grech v. Wainwright, 492
F.2d 747, 748 (5th Cir. 1974); Hall v. Wainwright, 493 F.2d 37, 39 (5th Cir. 1974).
10. Adams v. Murphy, 598 F.2d 982 (5th Cir. 1979).
11. Id.at983.
12. 394 So. 2d at 411.
13. Ryu, Contemporary Problems of Criminal Attempts, 32 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 1170, 1171
(1957). This was due primarily to the fact that there was originally no distinction between
dvil and criminal law. The focus of all law was on compensation for actual damage. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1172. The early English view was that all attempts which injure the community
are indictable. Rex v. Higgins, 102 Eng. Rep. 269 (1801). The basis of our modem doctrine is
that any attempt to commit a crime endangers the public welfare. Sayre, Criminal Attempts,
41 HARv.L. REv. 821, 834 (1928).
16. Sayre, supra note 15, at 834, 834 n.49. See, e.g., Rex v. Johnson, 2 Show. I (1678) (cited
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Lord Mansfield first formulated the modern concept 7 of attempt as a separate crime applicable to various target crimes.18 In Rex v. Scofield,'9 the defendant tried to burn down a house but failed. The defendant was charged
with attempt to commit a crime because there was no specific offense of attempted arson. In response, the defendant argued that an attempt to commit
a crime was also not a criminal offense.2° Recognizing a gap in the law, the
court was unwilling to release the defendant. Because his action had endangered society, it thus deserved punishment. Rather than add another crime
to the growing litany of attempt offenses, the court established the general
crime of attempt. Specifically, the court held that one who intends to commit
a crime and performs an act tending directly toward its commission is guilty
2
of criminal attempt. 1
The law of attempt has been generally codified in many American jurisdictions. Several states take a pre-Scofield approach, and punish only specified
23
attempts. 2 2 A majority of states, however, have general attempt statutes.

Florida has adopted a mixed approach, criminalizing both general 24 and selected specific attempts.2 5
in Sayre, supra note 15, at 830), where the defendant tried to bribe another to commit perjury,
but could not be convicted of subornation of perjury because the false testimony was never
given. The court did not rely on any general notion of attempt, but instead reasoned that any
effort to subvert justice would be a substantive offense.
17. Although no general doctrine was developed before then, an early notion of attempt
was recognized by the Star Chamber in the sixteenth century. See J. TURNER, KENNY'S OUTrLINES OF CRIMINAL LAW §61 (16th ed. 1952). The purpose of the equitable chamber was "to
punisheth errors creeping into the Commonwealth . . . yea although no positive law or continued custom of common law give warrant to it." W. HUDSON, TREATISE OF THE COURT OF
STAR CHAMBER, in 2 COLLEcTANEA JURIDmCA 107 (F. Hargrave, ed. 1791) (cited in Meehan,
The Trying Problem of Criminal Attempt- Historical Perspective, 14 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV.
137, 155 (1979)).
18. See Meehan, supro note 17, at 155; Sayre, supra note 15, at 834. Contra, J. HALL,
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAw 571 (2d ed. 1947); 1 W. RUSSELL, RUSSELL ON CRIME
175-76 (12th ed. 1964). Hall and Russell maintain that this concept was not formed until the
later case of Rex v. Higgins, 102 Eng. Rep. 269 (1801). Meehan, however, insists that Higgins
was only a solicitation case, whereas Rex v. Scofield, Cald. 397 (1784), was a true case of
attempt. Meehan, supra note 17, at 157-60.
19. Cald. 397 (1784).
20. Id. at 899.
21. Id. at 403. "The intent may make an act, innocent in itself criminal; nor is the completion of an act, criminal in itself, necessary to constitute criminality." Id. at 400. "If [the act]
is coupled with an unlawful and malicious intent ... the act becomes criminal and punishable." Id. at 403.
22. MODEL PENAL CODE, §5.01, Comment 20 and Statutory Appendix A. (Tent. Draft No.
10, 1960) (list of states and comparison of statutes).
23. As of May, 1960, thirty-six states had enacted general attempt statutes. Id.
24. FLA. STAT. §777.04 (1979). See note 27 and accompanying text, infra.
25. Several statutes specifically include an attempt. E.g., FLA. STAT. §918.14 (1979) (punishes one who endeavors or attempts to induce a witness). See Hestor v. State, 363 So. 2d
26 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1978) (there can be no crime of attempting to tamper with a witness,
since the statutory prohibition includes an attempt). Other statutes have been interpreted to
incorporate attempt into the crime itself. E.g., King v. State, 317 So. 2d 852, 853 (lst D.C.A.
1975), aff'd per curiam, 339 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1976) (the crime of uttering a forged instrument
is proven by an attempt).
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Florida's general attempt statute seeks to fill the legal gap recognized in
Scofield. Although the statute does not expressly define attempt, Florida courts
have interpreted the law to require the Scofield elements of an intent and an
act.26 The legislature has defined the latter element as an act done toward
the commission of the target crime but failing in perpetration or prevented in
execution.2 7 Courts have further refined this element, requiring an overt act
28
which moves beyond mere preparation and actually accomplishes some ap9
preciable portion of the crime attempted. The statute's requirement that the
act must fail is not an additional element of the offense but a self-evident state0
ment of the act's purpose.2 Because the purpose of a general attempt statute
is to fill gaps in the law which allow criminal acts to go unpunished, prosecu31
tion for attempt is unnecessary when the target crime is consummated.
Where specific attempts are prohibited by statute no gap exists, and thus
32
the general attempt statute has no application. For example, in King v.
33
State, the Florida First District Court of Appeal held that the crime of
4
uttering a forged instrument is fully proven by establishing an attempt
5
to negotiate a forged instrument. This statutory crime was found to include
a substantive attempt offense because the elements of the target crime and an
attempt would be identical. The King rationale was applied by the Fourth
36
District Court of Appeal in Silvestri v. State to overturn a conviction for an
attempt to make a false report of a crime. The court held that the target offense
was proven by demonstrating an attempt to convey false information to a police
26. See, e.g., Fleming v. State, 374 So. 2d 954, 955-56 (Fla. 1979); Gustine v. State, 86 Fla.
24,26, 97 So. 207, 208 (1923).
27. FrA. STAT. §777.04 (1979).
28. See, e.g., Gustine v. State, 86 Fla. 24, 26, 97 So. 207, 208 (1923); Hogan v. State, 50
Fla. 86, 88-89, 39 So. 464, 465 (1905).
29. Groneau v. State, 201 So. 2d 599, 603 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1967).
80. An attempt to commit a crime involves the idea of an incompleted, rather than a
consummated act. Robinson v. State, 263 So. 2d 595, 596 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1972). But it is generally held that an attempt contains only two essential elements, an intent and an overt act.
See, e.g., Hutchinson v. State, 315 So. 2d 546, 548 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1975).
31. However, in 1968, the Florida supreme court held that a charge of attempt must be
given even when there is sufficient evidence to find that the target crime was actually committed. Brown v. State, 206 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 1968). This decision has been highly criticized,
however, because it distorts the gap-filling function of an attempt charge. See, e.g., Silvestri
v. State, 332 So. 2d 351, 353 (4th D.C.A.), aff'd per curiam, 340 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 1976) (Judge
Schwartz rebukes the Brown decision for "its total lack of support in reason or logic").
32. See State v. Sales, 1-2 Nev. 778, 779-80 (1866) (since embracery is an attempt to bribe
a juror, there cannot be an attempt to commit embracery); note 25 supra. The assault cases
pose a similar problem because assault is often defined as an attempted battery. Most jurisdictions do not allow convictions for attempted assault. See, e.g., People v. Stouter, 142 Cal.
146, 75 P. 780, 782 (1904); White v. State, 22 Tex. 608, 609 (1858). But see State v. Wilson, 218
Or. 575, 590, 346 P.2d 115, 120-21 (1959).
33. 317 So. 2d 852 (1st D.C.A. 1975), aff'd per curiam, 339 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1976).
34. FLA. STAT. §831.02 (1979) provides punishment when an individual "utters and publishes as true a false, forged or altered ... writing mentioned in §831.01 knowing the same to
be false..."
35. 317 So. 2d at 853 (relying on Harrell v. State, 79 Fla. 220, 83 So. 922 (1920)).
36. 332 So. 2d 351 (4th D.C.A.), aff'd per curiam, 340 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 1976).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol33/iss4/9

4

Feinberg: Criminal Law: The Gap Between Attempt Law and Perjury in Florida
UNIVERSITY

OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[V/ol. XXXIII

officer. Thus the defendant's conviction for an attempt to attempt was im37
proper.
An attempt is also held not to exist for certain crimes such as conspiracy
and solicitation.38 In Hutchinson v. State39 the defendant had discussed with a
third party his desire to have someone murdered, and was convicted of attempted conspiracy. Noting that the facts were sufficient to maintain a conviction for solicitation, another gap-filling crime similar to attempt, 40 the court
reversed the conviction, finding that attempted conspiracy was not a criminal
offense. 41 The court utilized a dual rationale for its decision. First, it observed
that while both a criminal intent and a physical act are required for an attempt, only the criminal intent and an agreement are necessary for a conspiracy. 4 2 The court reasoned that chronologically, an agreement to commit
the target crime would precede an act toward its commission. 43 Thus, a conspiracy is farther removed from the intended crime than is an attempt."
Second, the court noted that because the defendant could be charged with the
crime of solicitation, there was no gap in the law, and therefore no need for
the crime of attempted conspiracy.Commentators have argued against the crime of attempt in cases where
commission of the crime is impossible.46 A legal gap occurs, however, when impossibility is allowed to defeat an attempt action. One who fails to commit a
crime because of impossibility has exhibited the same criminal intent and
overt act as one who attempts to commit a crime but fails by reason of interruption. The gap created by the impossibility defense has been narrowed by
some courts which distinguish between factual and legal impossibility- and
hold that only legal impossibility is a defense to an attempt charge.48 Other
37. Id. at 354.
38. R. PERKINS,

CRIMINAL LAW 505 (1957). See, e.g., State v. Davis, 319 Mo. 1222, 1230,
6 S.W.2d 609, 612 (1928); Gervin v. State, 212 Tenn. 653, 655-56, 371 S.W.2d 449, 450 (1963).
39. 315 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1975).
40. FLA. STAT. §777.04(2) (1979) punishes an individual for trying to persuade another
person to engage in criminal acts, regardless of whether the other person actually agrees to do
the acts. Thus, solicitation seeks to punish an individual for having criminal intent and for
doing an act which would otherwise be legal.
41. 315 So. 2d at 546.
42. Id. at 549 (construing Florida's conspiracy statute). See FLA. STAT. §777.04(3) (1979).
43. 315 So. 2d at 549. See Note, Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARv. L. REv. 920, 921-22 (1959).
44. 315 So. 2d at 548.
45. Id. at 549.
46. There are widely differing views on this subject. See generally Curran, Criminal and
Non-Criminal Attempts, 19 GEo. L.J. 185, 816 (1931); Hall, Criminal Attempts-A Study of
Foundations of Criminal Liability. 49 YALE L.J. 789 (1940); Ryu, supra note 13; Sayre, supra
note 15; Strahorn, The Effect of Impossibility on Criminal Attempts, 78 U. PA. L. REv. 962
(1980).
47. Factual impossibility exists when the target crime is impossible to accomplish because
of a physical impossibility unknown to the defendant, such as when one tries to pick an
empty pocket. Legal impossibility is present when, although the defendant completes every
act intended, he still has not committed the intended crime. It has been suggested that this
distinction be abandoned because of the difficulties inherent in classifying certain situations.
Strahorn, supra note 46, at 963. This has been accomplished in several states. See note 49 infra.
48. At early common law, physical impossibility was found to constitute a complete de-
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jurisdictions 49 have recognized that allowing this defense would defeat the gap
filling function of attempt and therefore have followed the Model Penal Code5°
position that impossibility is not a.defense to attempt.
Florida has apparently adopted this view. In Groneauv. State,"' the Fourth
District Court of Appeal held that to prove attempt it is not necessary to find
that the actor would have succeeded if he continued his course of conduct. 52
The court emphasized that an attempt may fail not only by interruption, but
also by any other extrinsic cause, provided the circumstances causing failure are
independent of the will of the attempter. 3
Courts and legislatures have rarely applied attempt concepts to perjury.54
In fact, only one court has dealt directly with this issue. In State v. Latiolais,55
the Louisiana supreme court held that Louisiana's general attempt statute56
could be applied to the target crime of perjury, and that this would not constitute an attempt to attempt. According to the court, the crime of perjury
does not encompass an attempt to commit perjury because if this target
crime is frustrated by extraneous circumstances, the only possible conviction
would be for an attempt.67 Applying the Scofield elements of an intent and an
act, the court held that if one intends to perjure, and performs an act toward
consummation but an element of perjury is lacking, the activity is punishable
under the general attempt statute. 8
In the instant case, the Florida supreme court began its analysis with a
fense to an attempt charge. Regina v. Collins, 169 Eng. Rep. 1477, 1478 (1864). This was
later overruled in Regina v. Ring, 66 L.T.R. (n.s.) 300, 301, 17 Cox C.C. 491, 492 (1892).
Legal impossibility, however, has always barred an attempt conviction. See, e.g., Rex v. Edwards, 172 Eng. Rep. 1344, 1347 (1834) (defendant not guilty of attempt to rob because the
act would not have been robbery if he had accomplished his purpose).
49. E.g. LA. Rzv. STAT. §14:27 (West 1974); N.Y. PAr.L LAW §110.10 (McKinney 1975);
OR. REv. STAT. §16:425 (1979).
50. MODEL PENAL CODE §5.01 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962) (requiring only that the
conduct be such as would constitute the crime if the attendant circumstances were as the
defendant believed them to be).
51. 201 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1967).
52. Id. at 603. Although the facts in Groneau did not present an impossibility situation,
the court cited to State v. Mazzadra, 141 Conn. 731, 109 A.2d 873 (1954), which did directly
confront the question of impossibility.
53. 201 So. 2d at 603.
54. Convictions for attempted perjury appear on the records in several states. E.g.,
Louisiana ex. rel. Gwin v. Dees, 410 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1969); State v. Glasser, 58 A.D.2d 448,
396 N.Y.S.2d 422 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977).
Statutory references to this crime are rare, however, one state statute refers to the allegations necessary in an indictment for both perjury and attempted perjury. OR. REV. STAT.
§162.065 (1979).
55. 225 La. 878. 74 So. 2d 148 (1954).
56. LA. REv. STAT. §14:27 (West 1974). This statute is quite similar to the general attempt
statute in Florida, except Louisiana's provision negates the defense of impossibility. Compare
id. with FLA. STAT. §777.04 (1979).
57. 225 La. at 882, 74 So. 2d at 150. To illustrate such circumstances, the court described
the situation where the person administering the oath to the defendant was not authorized or
qualified to administer it. Id., 74 So. 2d at 150.
58. Id., 74 So. 2d at 150.
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general discussion of attempt,5 9 noting the necessary elements 60 and Florida's
broad general attempt statute.6 ' Turning to case law the court cited King and
Hutchinson62 but relied most heavily on Silvestri, apparently finding that case's
attempt to attempt rationale controlling.63 The court explained that in a
typical attempt, failure to commit the crime results from "the absence of the
element of a criminal result." 64 Thus, a crime can only be attempted if that
crime is defined by its result. For example, it is possible to attempt murder
because its success depends on the consequence of an act.6 5 In other words, the
victim must die. However, the crime of perjury, according to the court, cannot
be the subject of an attempt because it is not defined in terms of result, but in
terms of an act. Perjury is fully proven by showing a willful false statement; it
is not necessary to establish that the false statement actually caused a miscarriage of justice.66
The court rejected a hypothetical posed by the state in which a conviction
for perjury was frustrated by the lack of an element such as the authority of the
person administering the oath, or the materiality of the defendant's testimony.67
Elements such as these, according to the court, did not constitute an attempt
because they were extraneous to the offender's action. 6
To clarify its position the court explained that in most criminal attempts,
failure to consummate the crime is caused by an interference, and that neither
the common law nor the statutory concepts of failure, intervention, interception, or prevention were meant to apply where the act failed because the elements of the target crime had not been met.6 9 The majority maintained that if
all the elements of perjury are present, then the crime is fully proven by show70
ing an attempt to commit perjury.
The three dissenters 7 ' felt that the court had correctly explained the elements of perjury and the definition of attempt, but had inconsistently applied
59. 394 So. 2d at 413.
60. Id. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
61. 394 So. 2d at 413. At the time of petitioner's original trial, the attempt statute in
effect was FLA. STAT. §776.04 (1973) (current version at FLA. STAT. §777.04 (1979)).

62. 394 So. 2d at 413-14. The court used these cases to support the general proposition
that some crimes may have no attempt element, but it did not state what specific parallels
could be drawn between these cases and the instant case.
63. Id. at 414-15. The court declared Silvestri to be the most analogous to the instant
case, and found that the reasoning of that court was directly applicable.

64. Id. at 414-15.
65. Id. Other examples given by the court were arson and robbery. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. This hypothetical was presented to the court to illustrate a gap situation. See
Brief of Respondent at 21, Adams v. Murphy, 598 F.2d 982 (5th Cir. 1979).
68. 894 So. 2d at 414.
69. Id. The court correctly stated that the common law did not allow an attempt conviction in such situations. See note 95 infra. But many statutes specifically allow an attempt
charge where all the elements of the target crime are not present. See notes 49 & 50 and

accompanying text, supra.
70. 394 So. 2d at 414.
71. Id. at 415. Justice Alderman wrote the dissent in which Justices England and
McDonald joined. In this close decision only four of the seven justices agreed that there
could be no crime of attempted perjury.
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them. 72 The dissent asserted that where the intent and overt act are present,

but there is a failure to commit perjury because an essential element is lacking, then an attempt to commit perjury is established. 73
Although the instant court applied the Scofield elements to perjury, it

failed to consider the gap filling purpose of attempt. When a perjury prosecution fails because of the absence of the element of a lawful oath74 or the

materiality of testimony,

5

conduct performed with a criminal intent is left

unpunished. This example, however, only evidences a gap in the law if the

conduct actually harms someone specifically or society in general. Whether this
is the case can only be answered by examining the crime of perjury more
closely. Perjury is sanctioned to prevent two distinct harms. First, perjury pro-

motes judicial decision-making on false information76 which is harmful to liti-

gants. Second, perjury damages the integrity of the legal system.77 Arguably, no
harm would result to litigants from perjury which was immaterial or was not
delivered under oath. When a ivitness lies intentionally, however, the court's
integrity is harmed regardless of the materiality of the testimony or the propriety of the oath. Thus, a gap does exist in the law. The apparently incon-

sistent cases cited by the court can be reconciled under this gap theory.78
in relying on King and Silvestri, the court implies that attempted perjury
may also be viewed as an attempt to attempt. These cases are distinguishable,
however. In King, the court found that an attempt proved the crime but this
acknowledged only that the forged instrument need not defraud anothers 0 The
essence of the crime of uttering a forged instrument is an intent to defraud
M
T

72. Id. The dissenters noted that while the majority found the crime of perjury was
proven by an attempt, a gap situation would exist when a perjury conviction was precluded
by the absence of an element such as materiality or lawful oath. Id.
73. Id.
74. There are several ways in which this element may be lacking, see, e.g., State ex. rel.
Hemmings v. Coleman, 137 Fla. 80, 187 So. 793 (1939) (oath given without subpoena having
been served is not lawful oath); Campbell v. State, 92 Fla. 775, 109 So. 809 (1926) (county
solicitor not authorized to administer oath to witness unless brought before him by process of

his court).

,

75. Many cases have been recorded where a perjury conviction failed because the false
testimony was not deemed material. E.g., Rivers v. State, 121 Fla. 887, 164 So. 544 (1935);
Bolen v. State, 103 Fla. 22, 137 So. 8 (1931).
76.

V.

RtcH,

LAW AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE

174 (1975). "The structure of our

legal system relies on the foundation of getting at the truth." Id. See Strahorn, supra note 46,
at 995.

77. The Model Penal Code notes that the crime of perjury helps to maintain the community's general sense of security and confidence in the state. MODEL PENAL CODE §208.20,
Comment (Tent. Draft No. 6,1957).
78. Both the King and Silvestri courts noted that the defendant could have been charged
for the target crime rather than the attempt. The Hutchinson court observed that the
solicitation statute would punish the defendant's acts. The instant court, however, clearly
recognized the possibility that an individual who tries to perjure himself may not be guilty
of any crime. 394 So. 2d at 414-15.
79. King v. State, 317 So. 2d 852 (1st D.CA. 1975), aff'd per curiam, 339 So. 2d 172 (Fla.

1976).
80. Crusoe v. State, 183 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1966). The forged instrument need not
even be passed, but may remain in the possession of the defendant. Id. at 603.
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another, regardless of successful consummation."' There was no gap here for
the court to fill because the defendant could have been charged with the actual
crime itself.
Silvestri is more analogous to the instant case. A false report may be made
to one believed to be a law enforcement officer, but who actually is not, just as
false information may be given under the mistaken belief that one is under
oath or is giving material testimony. Because Silvestri held that there can be no
attempt to make a false report of a crime,82 the decision seems compatible with
the instant case. The Silvestri court, however, ignored the question of impossibility. It simply held that any attempt to convey false information to a police
officer would constitute the actual crime.83 Thus, the Silvestri court did not
recognize that there was any gap that needed to be filled. 4
The Hutchinson decision is also cited in the instant case although its applicability is questionable. The instant court seems to view Hutchinson as another attempt to attempt case.8 5 But Hutchinson involved an attempt to commit a gap filling crime, conspiracy. The Hutchinson court refused to link one
preliminary crime to another, 6 reasoning that since even the target crime of
conspiracy does not require a physical act,8 7 an attempt to commit conspiracy
would be a "logical absurdity."'8 This is, however, a much more attenuated
81. Id.
82. 332 So. 2d 351 (4th D.C.A.), aff'd per curiam, 340 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 1976).
83. FLA. STAT. §817.49 (1979) provides: "Whoever willfully imparts, conveys, or causes to
be imparted or conveyed to any law enforcement officer, false . .. reports concerning ...
crime . . .knowing such . . . report to be false . . . shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." The
court apparently found that the statute's broad terminology was sufficient to prohibit an
attempt to convey false information. 332 So. 2d at 359.
84. It is not clear whether the Silvestri court would have reached the same result had
this gap been called to the courts attention. This seems particularly realistic in light of the
fact that the court deciding Silvestri was also the first to hold attempted perjury could be a
criminal offense. Adams v. State, 320 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1975) (per curiam). In
Groneau this same court found that an attempt charge may punish the defendant for what
he intended to do, rather than for what he actually did. See note 95 and accompanying text,
infra. In accord with this line of reasoning, a false report made to one believed to be a police
officer should still constitute a criminal attempt.
85. 394 So. 2d at 413. After explaining the attempt to attempt rationale used in King, the
instant court remarked that "this view of the nature of criminal attempts was also expressed
in Hutchinson v. State.. "
86. Hutchinson v. State, 315 So. 2d at 549. The court noted that both conspiracy and
attempt are inchoate crimes, and that "[tjo concede in the academic sense the possibility that
there can be an attempted conspiracy is not the equivalent of declaring it to be a reasonable
and punishable statutory offense." Id.
87. Common law recognized the necessity of a physical act to constitute attempt.
J. TuRNER, supra note 17, at 82. Hutchinson is not easily reconcilable with the instant case
because the act of giving false testimony is clearly a physical act. "An execution of the will
which is manifested in the form of speaking or writing is an act." R. PERKINS, supra note 38,
at 474. While the agreement to conspire may be manifested through speech, it is not the act
of speaking which is punishable, but the intent behind the agreement. Because of the greater
risk posed by collective action, the crime of conspiracy punishes conduct preparatory in
nature. See Note, supranote 43, at 921-22.
88. 315 So. 2d at 549. The court feared that such a construction would distort the concepts of both attempt and conspiracy. It also observed that because one person alone cannot
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situation than the one presented by the instant case. Moreover, in Hutchinson

there was no gap to fill since the crime of solicitation would punish the defendant's wrongful conduct.8 9

When the instant court addressed the issue of attempted perjury directly, it
distinguished attempted perjury from a typical criminal attempt by noting that
failure to commit the target crime of perjury would result not from an inter-

ruption, but from "the absence of an element extraneous to the offender's
actions." 90 This language, however, conflicts directly with the Fourth District
Court of Appeal's opinion in Groneau, a case which has been widely accepted
by courts within this jurisdiction. 91 Groneau stated clearly that an attempt may
result when the target crime fails due to an extrinsic cause, provided this cause
is independent of the will of the attempter. 92 Whether such failure is precipi-

tated by the absence of an element or by the intrusion of physical circumstances, the criminal intent exists. One who acts in furtherance of this intent
should not evade an attempt conviction because it would have been impossible

to commit the target crime.9 3 Recognizing this, the Groneau court explicitly
held that the possibility of success is not necessary in finding an attempt.94 In

fact, according to Groneau a defendant may be punished not for what he has
done, but for what he intended to do. 95 Otherwise there would exist a gap in

the law. Extrapolating from Groneau, one who intends to commit perjury and
does an act to further this intent is guilty of an attempt.
This same attitude is expressed by the Louisiana court in Latiolaisin findcommit conspiracy, King v. State, 104 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 1957), one person could not be guilty
of an attempt to conspire. 315 So. 2d at 549. Because the harm to be prevented in conspiracy is the danger of collective action, this harm is not present in Hutchinson.
89. See note 40 supra.
90. 394 So. 2d at 414.
91. The Groneau decision has been cited in nearly every recent case that deals with an
attempt, including the Hutchinson decision and the instant case. Although the instant court
uses this case to support the necessary elements of attempt, its language is conveniently forgotten at the dose of the opinion. See note 92 infra.
92. 201 So. 2d at 603. The statement "extraneous to the offender's actions" is quite similar
to "extrinsic cause independent of the will of the attempter." Compare Adams v. Murphy,
394 So. 2d at 414 with Groneau v. State, 201 So. 2d at 603. It thus appears that the instant
court is actually referring to the absence of an element, which would constitute a legal impossibility.
93. The suggestions of various commentators show that this is the most widely accepted
view. I P. BISHOP, CRIMINAL LAW §754 (8th ed. 1892) (evil to be corrected relates to apparent
danger rather than actual injury sustained); J. MIxR, HANDBooK OF CRmiNAL LAW §29 (C)
(1984) (crime must be apparently possible); Curran, supra note 46, at 185 (isolation of attempt
from intended act with reference to its societal harm). Contra, Sayre, supra note 15, at 839
(no criminal attempt where none of the intended consequences is in fact criminal).
94. 201 So. 2d at 603.
95. Id. at 602. This statement clearly rebukes the notion of impossibility, even when an
element of the target crime is missing. At common law, if an element of the statute were
missing, there could be no attempt to commit that target crime. E.g., Rex v. Carr, 168 Eng.
Rep. 854, 854 (1819); Regina v. James, 174 Eng. Rep. 924, 925 (1844) (if charging a loaded
gun at another is made a felony by statute, an attempt is not established by an effort to shoot
a person with a gun that is not loaded). According to Groneau, if one intends to shoot a
person with a loaded gun, he would be guilty of this attempt even if the gun were not loaded.
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ing that attempted perjury is in fact a crime.96 That court rejected the contention that an attempt to commit perjury will always result in the completed
crime, 97 thus recognizing that there was a gap left open by the strict requirements of the perjury statute. Accordingly, it concluded that the attempt to
attempt rationale was not appropriate. Although Louisiana does not follow
common law,98 their general attempt statute is similar to that of Florida. 99 It
has been interpreted as requiring the same two elements as the Florida Statute,
an intent and an act.100 Furthermore, Louisiana, like Florida, does not allow the
defense of impossibility. 1 1 Nevertheless, the Louisiana court accepted the exact
hypothetical rejected by the instant court, stating that an attempt may fail by
extraneous circumstances.102 This decision is more easily reconciled with both
the holding in Groneau and with the central purpose of attempt law first recognized in Scofield. Viewing Groneau and Scofield together, it is clear that an
act perpetrated with criminal intent should be punished regardless of the
reason the act is not consummated. Otherwise, a gap in the law exists.
The instant court correctly insisted that a conviction for perjury may be
maintained only if all the elements of perjury are present. 103 However, contrary to the Florida supreme court's holding, the elements of attempted perjury
were clearly present. 0 4 The courts rejection of the crime of attempted perjury
follows the view expressed in Hutchinson that the application of the general
attempt statute to any particular crime will depend solely upon the attitude
of the particular court towards extending it.1° 5 But Hutchinson also suggested
that this power should be used to fill gaps left open in the definition of a

96. State v. Latiolais, 225 La. 878, 74 So. 2d 148 (1954).
97. Id. at 882, 74 So. 2d at 150. The hypothetical situation described by the court to
illustrate this point was intended only to demonstrate one manner in which attempted
perjury could occur. Id. See note 57 supra. Presumably, the lack of the materiality of testimony

would be another.
98. Louisiana was formerly in the possession of France, and has retained much of the
French Civil Law. R. DAVID & J. BRIERLY, MAJOR LEGAL SYMrEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY 371

(2d ed. 1978).
99. See note 56 supra.
100. State v. Carter, 213 La. 829, 832, 35 So. 2d 747, 748 (1948). There must be the
specific intent to commit the target crime, and an overt act towards the end sought that goes
beyond preparation. Id.
101. The question of impossibility has been resolved in Louisiana by statute. See note 56
supra.

102. State v. Latiolais, 225 La. at 882, 74 So. 2d at 150.
103. 394 So. 2d at 414.
104. In the hypothetical situation rejected by the instant court, there is both an intent
to commit perjury and an overt act done towards its commission. However, the concern as
to why the act fails appears unfounded since the requirement of a failed act has been eliminated. See note 5 supra. This is supported by a remark made by Judge Schwartz inSilvestri.
"In passing, one wonders why a jury is permitted to pardon the defendant by finding him
guilty of a crime he did not commit but is not permitted to do so by finding him guilty of a
crime which no one could commit." 332 So. 2d at 354 n.l. If an act need not fail at all, clearly
the reason why it-fails should be irrelevant. Id.
105. Hutchinson v. State, 315 So. 2d at 548.
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criminal statute.106 The instant court ignores this admonition leaving a gap in
the law. Thus, in Florida, one who intends to He, and does He in a judidal
proceeding may still be innocent of any crime.
DYANNE
106.

E. FEINBERG

Id. See Arnold, Criminal Attempts, The Rise and Fall of An Abstraction, 40 YALE

L.J. 53, 75-76 (1930).
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